The growing American retired population increasingly is viewed for its economic development potential. The relationship between the elderly and local taxes may have a critical effect on this potential, however. This paper examines the local tax implications of an increasing elderly population in communities prohibiting tax referenda. In such communities, citizens have no direct role in tax decisions. The elderly's attitudes towards different local taxes are examined using telephone survey data, before using aggregate data to investigate the relationship between the elderly and the specific taxes used in communities. The results suggest that a high proportion of elderly do not affect the mix of local taxes, but that an increasing proportion does have an influence.
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The growing American elderly and retired popula-subject to voter approval, however. The impact of tion increasingly is viewed for its economic devel-a growing elderly population in such areas may be opment potential. Advocates of retirement-based entirely different than when citizens vote directly economic development argue that retirees are an about tax issues. attractive base upon which to build or diversify an This paper examines the local tax implications economy. In-migrant elderly are particularly at-of the elderly population in Pennsylvania, a state tractive, as they are relatively young (between 55 which does not allow local referenda. It first conand 65), purchase housing, deposit money in local siders attitudes towards local taxes in case studies banks, and contribute to the local economy without of four rural Pennsylvania counties, with attention demanding many services in return. In addition, to the influence of in-migrant vs. aged-in-place they argue, whether the retirees are in-migrants or status on those attitudes. The paper then takes a aging-in-place, retirement incomes are relatively broader focus by examining whether a large and stable, contrary to incomes in much of the private growing elderly population affects annual tax levsector.
ies, using secondary data for all municipalities in A growing elderly population may also affect Pennsylvania. The impacts considered include the ability of local governments to levy taxes. If a whether specific taxes are levied, and the relative growing elderly population hinders local govern-importance of those taxes. ments' abilities to raise taxes at the same time it increases the demand on public services, the net fiscal impact may be negative. Earlier studies have Impacts of the Elderly looked at the relationship between the elderly and local taxes, generally by examining the elderly's Many recent studies suggest that elderly insupport for local tax referenda or bonds. Most such migrants have positive economic impacts on their studies have suggested that the elderly are not sup-destination rural communities (Haas and Serow, portive of increasing taxes, with consequent impli-1988; Longino and Crown, 1990 ; Siegel and cations for local jurisdictions. These results may Leuthold, 1992; Hodge, 1991; Sastry, 1992 ; Wisenot hold true in states where tax levies are not man, 1991; Summers and Hirschl, 1985) . These impacts include direct impacts from the elderly's expenditures (Longino and Crown, 1990 ; Sum-some municipalities the other taxes provide the experienced growth in the number of elderly between 1980 and 1990, while the number of elderly in the other two counties had remained relatively taxes were assessed by positing the following scestable. Sampling was stratified into three different nartos. categories: 1) aged-in-place elderly, defined as "If some local taxes were raised in order to older than 54 and having lived in the county since lower other local taxes, without changing the before 1980; 2) in-migrant elderly, defined as total amount raised, would you lower, raise, or older than 54 and having moved into the county in keep the (real property tax; earned income tax; 1980 or later; and 3) the general population, deand occupation tax) the same." 2 fined as being between 18 and 54 years old. The telephone survey was conducted during the The question was asked for each of the three major fall of 1992. The final sample of 1,222 was ob-local taxes The majority of respondent wanted to tained through 6,452 eligible telephone calls, for a lower the real property tax, while keeping the response rate of about 19 percent.
1 This response earned icome tax and occupation tax the same rate is within the range of those reported following (see Table 2 ). Few respondents were willing to most telephone surveys (Frey, 1989; Kviz, 1977) . rase any of the taxes in exchange for lowering The final sample comprised 462 aged-in-place el-other taxes. derly, 360 in-migrant elderly, and 400 general population respondents.
Responses differed between the aged-in-place, dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent was in-migrants, and general population ( Table 2 ). The male, 0 if female. Whether the respondent owned aged-in-place were the most likely to want to lower their own home was also included in the analysis, the real property tax. Similar to the findings of under the assumption that home ownership might Deller and Walzer (1993) and of Tripple et al. predispose respondents against the real property (1988), the elderly generally were not supportive tax. It was measured using a dummy variable set to of increasing the real property tax. The general 1 if they owned their home, and set to 0 if not. population was more likely than the other groups Home ownership was not correlated strongly with to be willing to raise the real property tax, though the income variables (correlation was less than such responses were relatively infrequent.
.107). The elderly were slightly more likely to favor
The first model in Table 3 presents the results of lowering the earned income tax, and less likely to the analysis of the probability of respondents wantfavor raising it, compared with the general popu-ing to lower real property taxes. The dependent lation. For the occupation tax, the elderly were variable was 1 if the respondent wanted to lower both less likely to want to raise and lower it than the real property tax, and 0 otherwise. The equathe general population. Aged-in-place and in-tionchi-square was 53.89. Aged-in-place, income, migrant elderly were more likely than the general and education were the only statistically significant population to want to leave the occupation and variables. The aged-in-place were more likely to earned income taxes unchanged.
favor reducing real property taxes. Households The relationship between the personal character-with incomes of $30,000 or more a year were less istics of respondents and their attitudes toward likely to want to lower property taxes, particularly raising and lowering taxes were further analyzed for incomes over $40,000. An interpretation of this by logistic regression. The model examined was of result is that alternative income-or occupationthe following form:
based taxes would cost higher income respondents more than they would benefit from the real prop-(1) Y = f(P 1 . *, Pn) erty tax reductions. Respondents with at least some college education were also less likely to want to where Y is a dichotomous dependent variable, and lower property taxes. P's are personal characteristics of respondents.
The second model in Table 3 presents results of Several studies have suggested that the influence the analysis of the attitude toward keep real propof age on attitudes towards taxes is insignificant erty taxes the same. The dependent variable was 1 when education level and income are considered if the respondent wanted to keep the real property (Button and Rosenbaum, 1989; Rubinfeld, 1977) . tax the same, and 0 otherwise. The equation chiEducational attainment was measured by a dummy square was 40.27. Income and education again variable. If a respondent had received at least some were statistically significant, in addition to the recollege education, the education variable was 1, spondent being male. Having a household income while if they had no college experience the vari-of $30,000 or more a year and having some college able was set equal to 0. In the survey, total income education increased the likelihood of respondents was divided into five different categories; less than desiring to keep real property taxes the same. Be-$10,000 a year; between $10,000 and $20,000; ing male was associated with a decreased probabetween $20,000 and $30,000; between $30,000 bility of wanting to keep real property taxes the and $40,000; and greater than $40,000. A series of same. Similar analysis was conducted on the orthogonal contrasts (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, earned income tax and the occupation tax, but the 1973) was used (with those earning less than models produced statistically insignificant results. $10,000 per year excluded) to include income in Analysis conducted on the probability of responthe logit analyses. dents believing each tax should be raised also proWhether a respondent was aged-in-place was duced statistically insignificant results. important because it was hypothesized that "long These two models demonstrate that even when term" residents may have different attitudes to-controlling for income and education, elderly stawards local taxes than in-migrant elderly. Because tus, in this case aged-in-place, also may influence age and aged-in-place status were highly corre-attitude towards taxes. Aged-in-place elderly were lated, alternative equations were estimated omit-more likely to want to lower the real property tax ting each in turn. Age was measured by the re-than were other respondents. There was no statisspondents' actual age. Aged-in-place provided a tically significant difference between the elderly better fit in both models.
and non-elderly with regard to keeping the real The sex of the respondent was measured by a property tax the same, however. Taxes Actually Levied than tax composition (Ladd, 1992) . Much of the literature that does exist has been largely theoretWhether the elderly's attitudes towards lowering ical (see, for example, Hettich and Winer, 1988 ; the real property tax have a meaningful impact on and Inman, 1989). Little of the earlier work has local tax policy is important to consider. This can examined the influence of the elderly on local be done by considering the relationship between taxes. Potential influences could include whether the elderly and specific referenda or tax increases the elderly affect which specific taxes are actually (see, for example, Deller and Walzer, 1993; Trip-levied by local governments, or how much the lople et Button, 1989 ; Hamilton and Co-cal governments rely upon these various taxes. hen, 1974). In states which do not allow local tax Each supposition will be examined in turn. referenda, it is necessary instead to look directly for evidence that these attitudes are reflected in Whether Specific Taxes are Levied local tax policy.
The existing literature that focuses on the level Table 4 shows the relationship between the perand composition of local taxes provides only par-centage of municipalities which levied each tax in tial direction in this effort. More attention has been 1991, and changes between 1980 and 1990 in the paid to analysis of the demand for public services proportion of elderly in the municipalities' total population. For example, if the proportion of el-nants of government spending. The theoretical isderly in a municipality increased from 15 percent sue is how governments actually choose quantities of the total population in 1980, to 19.5 percent of of public goods. The issue typically is examined the total population in 1990, the share increase by looking at voting behavior as the mechanism by would be 4.5 percent. Such changes can occur be-which individuals make their preferences known to cause the elderly are migrating into the municipal-government officials. The institutional context is ities; the non-elderly are leaving, thus increasing "direct democracy" (citizens vote directly on dethe percentage of the aging-in-place; or because of cisions) vs. "representative democracy" (where a combination of both.
elected representatives vote on the decisions) Municipalities which experienced the largest (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984) . The main analytshare increases in the percentage of elderly were ical approach uses median voter models (Inman, more likely than municipalities with smaller in-1978; Romer and Rosenthal, 1979; Chicoine et al., creases to levy the earned income tax, the real 1989). Although Pennsylvania has neither direct property transfer tax, the mercantile tax, the occu-democracy nor referendum, the models do present pational privilege tax, and "all other" taxes. Only situations wherein possible influences of the elder-82 percent of municipalities in which the elderly ly and retired population can be examined. became a smaller share of the population, for exIn the optimal constitution decision summarized ample, levied the earned income tax, as opposed to by Boadway and Wildasin (1984) , the potential 94 percent of the municipalities with the largest incentive for the elderly to influence taxing deciincreases in the proportion of elderly. Apparently, sions is apparent. For a decision rule requiring the elderly influence government officials' deci-only majority rule, the likelihood that costly taxing sions to utilize taxes that are less burdensome on and public spending decisions can be imposed on their primary income sources.
the elderly may be relatively high. The "represenThese results provide the basis for a more de-tative individual" will prefer such a voting rule tailed analysis of the particular Pennsylvania situ-because the costs (personal and public) of reaching ation. Because attitudes toward the earned income a decision will be lower than higher levels of retax differed, and because the earned income tax quired voting percentage (Boadway and Wildasin, generally plays an important role in the municipal-1984). The elderly, however, could be presumed ities which levy it, the influence of the elderly to view the personal costs of majority decisions as population on whether or not that tax is levied in a more of a concern, and would thus work directly municipality will be investigated further.
(lobby the representatives) to influence decisions. This analysis can be placed in the context of They can afford to do this as they have the time to more general models that examine the determi-devote to such activities. The cost involved to in- fluence the decision may be less than the cost that shift" variables. The first model is estimated as a could be imposed on them by the majority. More logistic regression of the following form: importantly for the usefulness of these models, y = f(p P. L L such actions by the elderly and retired could be (2) T, , *, n I considered cases of direct democracy.
Inman (1978) discussed and tested the median where Y is a dichotomous dependent variable set to income voter model to examine local government 1 if the municipality levied the earned income tax fiscal choice. In this model the hypothesis is that and 0 if it did not. The P's are population characgovernments select their budgetary and service-teristics of the municipality, L's are location charprovision levels "as if" to maximize the well-acteristics, and T's are tax characteristics of the being of the median income family, or voter. Such municipality. a voter is not likely to be retired or elderly. NevButton (1992) found attitudes towards school isertheless, while generally confirming the hypoth-sues split along age lines, implying that the proesis, Inman's results include points that are partic-portion of elderly in the population may affect ularly relevant to this study.
which perspectives are reflected in local tax polInman found that the median public service icy. The percent of the population aged 65 and quantity demanded equaled the quantity demanded over in 1990 was included in the regression as a by a median income voter times a political shift reflection of this potential political or social influterm, which depends on the percent of the town's ence exerted by the elderly. Similarly, the change residents in various community subgroups. This in the proportion of the elderly in the municipality issue is relevant in the context of the present study, between 1980 and 1990 was used to reflect how where the absolute number and percentage of el-these influences may be changing. derly is growing. Inman maintains that if analysis Because Ladd (1992) and Inman (1989) focused neglects the subtleties of local politics, biased pa-their analyses on relatively homogeneous municirameter estimates can result. Introducing political palities (suburban municipalities and large U.S. variables permits identification of special cases, cities, respectively), they did not consider whether and of the variables which are most effective in the size of a municipality can influence taxes. This moving a community away from the median in-is an important concern because larger municipalcome family's preferred service level. In Inman's ities in more likely than smaller jurisdictions to study, the elderly had the biggest "social interest" have professionally trained managers who can impact (negative) on school spending. Knowledge evaluate tax alternatives. The total municipal popof the relative importance of these special interest ulation in 1990 was included to reflect the potential groups can be important.
influence of municipality size. Ladd (1992) and The particular models of the demand for local Button (1992) also included per capita income in public services implied by the median voter hy-their analyses. Income is important because it repothesis are presented in slightly different forms flects the revenue generating potential of the by Inman (1978) and by Chicoine et al. (1989) . earned income tax, as well as reflecting the social Inman portrays the generalized public service de-characteristics of the municipality. All these popmand as a function of family income, a family's ulation variables were measured using the 1980 tax share, and demand factors which are common and 1990 Census of Population. to all residents within the town. The assumption is Location characteristics were measured by that the last set of factors has a negligible effect on whether the municipality is located in a metropolthe demand for public services (Inman, 1978, p . itan or nonmetropolitan county, Municipalities in 49). The present study provides a direct test of this metropolitan counties in Pennsylvania are more assumption; that factors will differ for the elderly. likely to provide a different mix of local services Chicoine et al. state that the normal model speci-than those offered by nonmetropolitan municipalfication for public service demand is a function of ities, affecting the probability of the municipality's median family income, the tax share of the median levying the earned income tax. The metropolitan family home, and other relevant tastes, prefer-variable was given a 1 if the municipality was loences, and service condition variables. In their par-cated in a metropolitan county, and a 0 otherwise. ticular analysis, they include three measures of Tax characteristics of the municipality included taxes and township population.
the real property tax base per capita, reflecting the The particular models to be examined in this potential tax revenue available via the real property study contain similar sets of variables, plus two tax. Municipalities with a smaller tax base per capmeasures of the elderly population as "political ita will have a more difficult time raising real prop-erty tax revenue, potentially increasing their prob-a municipality levying the earned income tax inability of levying the earned income tax. The tax clude having a larger tax base per capita, being characteristics also included the local tax revenues located in a metropolitan county, and having per capita from each of the local taxes (including greater per capita tax revenue from the occupathe per capita, occupation, real property transfer, tional privilege and other local taxes. Having a mercantile, occupational privilege, and other larger population, greater per capita income, and taxes). These were included to represent the rela-receiving greater per capita tax revenue from the tive importance of the various taxes in each mu-per capita, occupation, real property transfer, or nicipality. The tax characteristics were measured mercantile tax were associated with a decreased using a state compilation of 1991 financial reports likelihood of a municipality levying the earned infrom all 2516 Pennsylvania municipalities (Penn-come tax. sylvania Department of Community Affairs 1991), With respect to the influence of the elderly, inand the 1990 Census of Population.
creases in the proportion of elderly in a municipal- Table 5 presents results of the logit analysis for ity were associated with a greater chance of levythe likelihood of levying the earned income tax. ing the earned income tax. Simply having a larger The fit of the equation was good, with an equation proportion of the population as elderly, in contrast, chi-square of 289.6. The results were consistent was associated with a smaller probability of levywith the contingency table analysis in Table 4 . ing the earned income tax. This implies that the Factors associated with the increased likelihood of elderly by themselves may not be affecting whether the earned income tax is levied. A higher percentage of elderly may mean the earned income tax Tables 1 and 2 in this study), the next section population age 65 and examines this relationship in more detail. The real over 0.10*** (0.03) property tax generally is used to balance local bud- where Y is the percent of total tax revenues which ***p < .001 come from the real property tax. This data came from the Pennsylvania Department of Community levying the occupation, occupational privilege, or Affairs. other local taxes were positively associated with The P's are population characteristics of the mu-greater reliance on the real property tax, while nicipality, L's are location characteristics, and T's levying the per capita tax and earned income tax are tax characteristics of the municipality. The were negatively associated. The influence of the population and location characteristics in the re-real property assessment per capita and size of the gression were identical to those used earlier in the municipal population were statistically insignifilogit analyses, and included the municipal popula-cant. tion in 1990, the percentage of the population aged
The results also show that a larger percentage of 65 and over in 1990, the change in the proportion the elderly makes it more likely that a municipality of the elderly in the municipality between 1980 will rely more heavily upon the real property tax. and 1990, per capita income, and whether the mu-An increase in the proportion of the elderly benicipality is located in a metropolitan county. Sim-tween 1980 and 1990, however, was associated ilar to the logit analyses, tax characteristics in-with relying less upon that tax. The former result cluded the real property tax base per capita, and may occur because with a higher percentage of the other local taxes are levied in the municipality, elderly in a taxing district, taxes on wage earners which were included through a series of dummy may not yield sufficient revenue. At the same variables. If a tax was levied in the municipality its time, as the numerical influence, and presumably corresponding variable was set equal to 1, other-political influence, of the elderly increases, they wise it was 0. Dummy variables were included for may be taxes less (This would be an example of the occupation, per capita, earned income, real Inman's (1978) "political shift" effect.). property transfer, mercantile, amusement, occupational privilege, and "all other" local tax cate-Summary and Conclusions gory.
The model was estimated using two-limit tobit The elderly and retired are becoming a larger proanalysis because the dependent variable was portion of the population, and this trend is exbounded by 0 and 1. Table 6 presents results of the pected to continue. Increasingly, this group is betobit analysis. Location in a metropolitan area and ing looked at for its economic development potential; for its positive impacts on local economies. Another aspect of these impacts is the potential being more predisposed towards taxes which treat **p < .01 their income and property favorably. The attitudes ***p < .001 of the non-elderly also reflected self interest;
higher income was associated with a smaller like-patterns of tax reliance, with particular attention to lihood of wanting to lower the real property tax. whether they precede or follow the influx of inEarlier studies of the relationship of the elderly migrant elderly. Research also should investigate and local taxes generally have relied upon analysis more specifically how the tax burden is distributed of referenda (Hamilton and Cohen, 1974 ; Piele and between the elderly and non-elderly when the local Hall, 1973; Button and Rosenbaum, 1989; Button, tax mix can be altered. 1992; Deller and Walzer, 1993) . Such voter records provide a method of measuring attitudinal differences between the elderly and non-elderly, References and the influence of those attitudes on local tax decisions. When citizens do not vote directly on Biggar, J.C., C.F. Longino, Jr., and C.B. Flynn. "Elderly local tax issues, however, referenda-based analysis Finally, given the increasing size, influence and Graves, P.E. and T.A. Knapp. (1988) . "Mobility Behavior of interest in the elderly and retired population, fur- 
